The
Internet in India and China
It
is our hypothesis that the Internet will make a significant contribution to the
quality of life in developing nations.
Since roughly 38% of the global population lives in China or India, the
progress of the Net in those nations deserves careful study and
consideration. We conducted a study of
the state of the Internet in China and
India during the summer of 1998,[1]
and found much that is typical of developing nations in both.
The
paper begins with a comparison of the state of the Chinese and Indian Internets
along six dimensions. India joined the Internet before China, but the Chinese
Internet quickly caught or surpassed India on each of our dimensions. We offer explanations of this situation by
comparing determining factors in telecommunication infrastructure, human
resources, equipment and the economy, and government interest and support.
In
spite of frequent claims that the Internet will erode national sovereignty,
government interest and support is seen to be important both directly and
indirectly through its influence on the other factors. Both governments are now committed to the
Internet, and we examine changing government roles, primarily the adoption of
an ambitious Action Plan in India and the consolidation of two key Ministries
in China. The Indian Action Plan
addresses each of our six dimensions, and is designed to elevate India to the
level of IT superpower. The impact of Chinese
consolidation is less clear, but will also be important in determining the
future of the Internet there. We
conclude with a discussion of sources of uncertainty.
Comparing the Internet in
India and China
We
evaluated the Indian and Chinese Internets on six dimensions, starting with pervasiveness. The Internet is more pervasive in China where there are an
estimated 1.2 million accounts versus only approximately 200,000 in India, and
host count estimates give China a lead of roughly eight to one.[2]
The research and education networks have been particularly effective in China, where
they account for more than half a million users.
China
also leads in geographic
dispersion. Commercial Internet
access is available in over 200 cities representing all Chinese provinces,
while India has Internet POPs in only 17 of 32 States and Union
Territories. China qualifies for a
higher rating on our scale, but, usage is concentrated in large cities in
both nations, and villages (roughly 70%
of both populations) are completely unserved.
India has opened the ISP market, which was a government monopoly at the
time of our study, and may therefore improve rapidly.
China
leads in sectoral absorption as
well. Business connectivity is rare
(under 10%) in China, but there are fewer than 400 connected businesses in
India. While connectivity is almost
non-existent in primary and secondary schools in both nations, over 300 Chinese
universities and 200 research institutes have direct connectivity. Government connectivity and Web sites are
rare in both nations as is usage in the health sector.
Connectivity infrastructure is a function of domestic
backbone, the prevalence of high-speed access, Internet exchanges and
international bandwidth. India has
little terrestrial backbone, relying almost exclusively on satellite links. China uses both satellite and terrestrial
links. For example, ChinaNET connects
its centers with 155 Mbps circuits and connects to its 200 POPs at between 2
and 34Mbps. Nothing close to this exists in India. Neither nation operates Internet exchange
points at present, but China has plans to.[3] China has more organizations connecting with
leased lines, and is experimenting with cable modem and xDSL, but they are not
deployed in either nation. Finally,
China has more than double India's international bandwidth. In spite of China's relative advantage, we
must bear in mind that aggregate bandwidth per user is very low compared to a
developed nation, rendering interactive applications such as Web access
impractical in many cases -- email is the primary application in all developing
nations.
Organizational
infrastructure is concerned with competition in the telecommunication and Internet
industries and with coordination and organization in the Internet
industry. Telecommunication is
monopolized in both nations.
Ironically, there has been more Internet competition in China where
there are four interconnecting networks.
Two of these serve only education and research, but the other two are
open, and there are 200 competing access networks downstream from these. Until recently, the Indian government
monopolized the Internet, but backbone and access competition have now been
authorized. While interconnecting network competition is beginning in India,
the ministries which operate China's commercial interconnecting networks, the
Ministry of Electronic Industries (MEI) and Ministry of Post and
Telecommunications (MPT), are being merged into a new Ministry of Information
Industries (MII), which may reduce backbone competition. At the same time, there is immense pressure
on the part of the central government and Premier Rongji to introduce
competition into the telecommunication industry. As part of this attempt, China UNICOM, the nations second
telecommunications provider, is being reinvigorated. During the latter part of 1998, a number of plans for
restructuring China Telecom have been considered by the Chinese State
Council. The one most likely to succeed
involves separating the paging, wire-line, and mobile communication businesses,
and breaking the wire-line business into 18 separate companies along regional
lines. What impact this restructuring
will have on the competitiveness of the Internet backbone market remains to be
seen.
Sophistication of use is comparable in the two nations, with the Internet
increasing efficiency of conventional organizations and processes, for example
in substituting for mail and FAX. Both
nations may make similar innovations in the future since they are
demographically similar in many ways.
For example, both have large rural populations, and will be motivated to
innovate in the use of the Internet to address the needs of villages and in
inventing new applications, technology and organizations to enable that
service. (The Indian government has
officially recognized this as a priority).
In
summary, Table 1 shows that, today, China is currently doing as well or better
than India on each of our dimensions and key sub-components. This situation may change with the advent of
Internet competition and the government adoption of an ambitious IT Action Plan
in India. We will discuss this changing
government role below, but first, why did China start late and how did it surpass India?
|
Dimension
or component |
Advantage: C=China E=Even |
|
Pervasiveness |
|
|
users |
C |
|
hosts |
C |
|
geographic dispersion |
|
|
top-tier
political divisions with POPs |
C |
|
number
of cities with POPs |
C |
|
sectoral absorption |
|
|
commercial |
E |
|
education |
C |
|
government |
E |
|
health |
E |
|
Connectivity
infrastructure |
|
|
domestic
backbone |
C |
|
high-speed
access |
E |
|
exchanges |
E |
|
international
bandwidth |
C |
|
Organizational infrastructure
|
|
|
telecommunication
competition |
E |
|
backbone
competition |
C |
|
access
provider competition |
C |
|
coordinating
organizations |
E |
|
Sophistication of use |
E |
|
|
|
|
Table 1: Dimension
Comparison Summary |
|
Comparing Key Determinants
Internet
progress in a nation depends upon determining factors including the
availability of telecommunication infrastructure, networking technicians and
trained, demanding users, networking and end-user hardware, and an interested,
supportive government.[4] China enjoys advantages in many of these
areas.
Telecommunication
Infrastructure
Telecommunication
infrastructure is an important element in Internet growth, and, although India
and China lag behind industrial nations, China has invested heavily during the
1990s. As a result, Chinese
telecommunication infrastructure has grown much faster than that of India. Table 2 shows this growth gap for selected
indicators, and virtually all aspects of China's telecommunication
infrastructure have grown more rapidly.
The gap has continued to widen since 1996, as India's capital
expenditure for telecommunication was $1.794 billion in 1996 while China
invested $13.038 billion.[5] This rapid buildup in China requires outside
financing, and China has been much more successful than India in attracting
direct foreign investment.[6] The Chinese may not have been thinking
of the Internet when they decided to
invest in telecommunication infrastructure, but it has helped regardless.
|
|
China |
India |
||
|
|
1990 |
1996 |
1990 |
1996 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Mainlines (1,000) |
6,850.3 |
54,947 |
5,074.7 |
14,542.7 |
|
Mainlines/100 capita |
0.6 |
4.46 |
0.6 |
1.54 |
|
Mainline waiting list (1,000) |
688.8 |
812 |
1,961 |
2,894.2 |
|
International circuits (1,000) |
|
30.8 |
|
11.5 |
|
Outgoing international (M minutes) |
350 |
1433.2 |
146.7 |
342 |
|
|
||||
|
Table
2. Indicators of telecommunication
growth and capacity[7] |
||||
The Chinese also operate their telecommunication
system more efficiently. They have over
4.4 times the revenue per employee and 3.3 times as many mainlines per staff
member as India.[8] One explanation of Chinese efficiency is
that they decentralize decision making, pushing investment and service
decisions to the provincial or city level.
India's legendary bureaucracy also cuts
efficiency. For example, spectrum
allocation is parceled out to government agencies each of which manages its own
slice, leading to sub-optimization.
Human
Resources -- Technicians and Users
A
robust Internet also requires investment in human capital. Both networking leaders and technicians and
demanding users are required. India and
China followed a common pattern in that the Internet began with universities
and research institutes.[9] In such cases, the early networking
community provides leadership and technical knowledge.
While Chinese academic networking began with
X.25 in 1987, IP connectivity did not begin until 1993, and broader university
Internet access (both UUCP and IP) began to take off in 1995. The two academic networks, CERNET and
CSTNet, were instrumental in extending the Internet beyond the academic and
research communities by their example and leadership and in offering commercial
service, and they have continued to thrive, accounting for roughly 50% of
Chinese users. Approximately 25% of
Indian users are from universities.
The education and research network (ERNET) pioneered
Indian networking, but did not play as important a technical and leadership
role. They were funded by United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for many years, and were therefore
isolated from performance and market demands.
They spent early years planning at a time when UUCP networks were being
rapidly deployed in other developing nations, and when available, their service
was often unreliable. When UNDP funding was withdrawn in 1995, it was not clear
that ERNET would even survive.[10] They had interim funding for two years and
finally became an Autonomous Society in 1998, but their budget, staffing
levels, telecommunication-subsidy levels, and office location are yet to be
determined.
Chinese universities were more entrepreneurial
than those of India. Funding in China
came from both the Ministry of Education and the individual universities, while
Indian universities received very little money from the government and paid
nothing themselves.
Network
leaders and technicians are on the supply side, but the Internet also needs
trained, demanding users. These are
initially from the university and research communities, but demand from other
sectors soon becomes dominant. At this
early stage, a lack of demand does not appear to have constrained Internet
diffusion in either nation. While
education and literacy rates are low (particularly in India), the absolute
numbers of potential users are high.
Roughly five percent of the population of South Asia speaks English.[11] This translates into nearly 50 million
potential Indian users since English speakers are generally well educated and
able to afford a computer and Internet account or access at a public
venue. The educated middle class in
China is also large in absolute terms.
Both nations have large university systems -- in 1990, 4,425,247 Indians
and 2,651,396 Chinese were enrolled in higher education.[12] For the time being, the number of educated,
middle-class people in both nations is large relative to the number of Internet
users.
Equipment
and the Economy
The
Internet also requires end-user equipment (PCs), and networking equipment. Relatively large numbers of PCs are a direct
advantage in that they are available for use and an indirect advantage in that
the people operating them become trained potential users. The ITU estimated that there were 3.7
million PCs installed in China and 1.1 million in India in 1996, [13]
and, as shown in Table 3, the gap is expected to grow.
|
|
China |
India |
||
|
|
Millions of PCs Sold |
Annual Growth Rate |
Millions of PCs Sold |
Annual Growth Rate |
|
1996 |
2.98 |
|
0.38 |
|
|
1997 |
3.9 |
31% |
0.47 |
24% |
|
1998
(estimate) |
4.95 |
27% |
0.62 |
32% |
|
1999
(estimate) |
6.27 |
27% |
0.85 |
37% |
|
Total |
18.1 |
|
2.32 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Table
3. PC sales (1998, 9 are estimates)[14] |
||||
The
Chinese advantage in PCs reflects two factors.
China has been more heavily involved in PC manufacturing and trade and
has established brands like Great Wall and Legend. China produced over 1.5 million PCs in 1996 and the government
predicts over 10 million units by 2000.
One company, Legend, produced 350,000 PCs in 1997, while all of India
assembled only 500,000. China also
produces and exports PC components, for example, 12 million motherboards and 8
million monitors in 1996.[15]
The
second factor is affordability. Whether a computer is purchased by an organization
for employees or by a family for the home, the cost is large relative to
budgets in developing nations and hard currency is required. A low-end, Internet-ready PC costs around
$1,000 in either nation, but China is richer, making PCs relatively more
affordable.[16]
Networking
equipment is also an issue. To date, it
has nearly all been imported in both nations; however, China seems more likely
to eventually develop a network equipment industry. One clue to the possible future differences between the two is
provided by the fact that the Chinese telecommunication-export industry was
more than 25 times as large as that of India in 1996. [17] Cisco Systems has agreed to assemble routers
in China. This may have been partially
motivated by pressure from the Chinese government, but access to
infrastructure, local availability of components like power supplies and
service like sheet metal fabrication make China an attractive manufacturing
location. Cisco has decided to invest
$100 million in various activities within China.[18] Bay Networks (now part of Nortel) will
establish an architectural lab in Beijing,[19]
and 3Com will invest $100 million in several activities, including networking.[20]
It
is interesting to note that Cisco has opened a 75-person software development
center in India, but this reflects a smaller investment.[21] It parallels the effort of the Microsoft
Windows NT development group in Hyderabad with roughly 20 programmers.[22] The sizes of these programming groups and
the hardware manufacturing volumes in China, indicate that the hardware side of
the “information economy” may have a greater impact on GNP than the software
side.
All
of the above factors -- telecommunication infrastructure, human resources and
equipment require costly investment which must occur within the context of the
broader economy. While both India and
China are developing nations with scarce resources, China is more productive
and prosperous today (Table 4). In 1980, GDP per capita (in 1987
dollars) was $134 in China and $262 in India.[23] Indian policy changes in 1980 helped GDP
growth accelerate to over 5% per year during the 1980s, but since China's
market-oriented reforms began in 1978, real GDP growth has averaged over 9% per
year.[24]
|
|
India |
China |
|
|
|
|
|
GNP ($ billion), 1995 |
325 |
745 |
|
GNP per capita, 1995 ($) |
340 |
620 |
|
Gross domestic investment as % of GDP, 1994 |
23 |
42 |
|
Gross domestic savings as % of GDP, 1994 |
21 |
44 |
|
Imports as % of GDP, 1994 |
12 |
24 |
|
Exports as % of GDP, 1994 |
15 |
23 |
|
Direct foreign
investment, 1995 ($ billion) |
3.487 |
35.849 |
|
|
|
|
|
Table
4: National income and trade
indicators.[25] |
||
In addition to being more productive, China has greater
propensities to save, invest, and trade than India. Since the time of Mahatma Ghandi, India has followed a
self-reliance policy motivated by economic and security considerations. Reform and opening began in 1991, and direct
foreign investment rose from $162 million in 1990 to $1.3 billion in 1995,[26]
but China still enjoys a wide, growing lead in international investment and
trade.
Government
Interest and Support
While
telecommunication, including the Internet, may erode some aspects of national
sovereignty, all of the factors we have mentioned are influenced directly or
indirectly by government policy and
action. In every nation, government
plays a central role in Internet diffusion, but that role can change over
time. For example, the U. S. government
led in establishing the Internet and earlier networks through purchases,
research, and direct operation, but it has drawn back as industry stepped in.[27] Historically, the Indian government has
impeded the Internet with a combination of indifference and government
monopoly, though it appears ready for a bold change of direction, and the
Chinese government first considered the potential risks, then moved relatively
rapidly once it decided to join the Internet.
Indian IT policy has vacillated over the
years. The deployment of mainframe
computers was interrupted when IBM withdrew from India in response to a 1976
law limiting foreign ownership of business to 40 percent. Rajiv Gandhi assumed leadership after the
assassination of his mother in 1984, and identified telecommunications and
information technology as a "core sector" along with traditional
industries like power, steel, oil and automobiles.[28] The Internet languished after Gandhi's
assassination with the government using the authority granted in the Indian
Telegraph Act of 1885 to stop private ISPs from operating. Only powerful government agencies have been
able to become ISPs serving limited constituencies, and the Ministry of
Communication has kept a monopoly over commercial ISP service. Whether motivated by a desire to maintain
revenue, power, or control over technical issues, the Indian Government moved
slowly in embracing the Internet, and resisted the global trend toward
privatizing telecommunication and introducing competition.
The election of the BJP in 1997 signaled renewed
interest in IT and the Internet. BJP
advocates economic liberalization, and listed IT as one of the government’s
five top priorities. This commitment
led to the establishment of a high-level IT Task Force in May, 1998. If the recommendations of the Task Force are
implemented, the Indian Internet will grow dramatically, and may close the gap
with China.
Governments are aware of the potential
advantages and risks of the Internet.[29] It is seen as having potential to improve
the economy, education, health care, environment, and the quality of life,
particularly in rural areas, but these are weighed against the possible threat
to the stability of the regime,[30]
national security, and cultural values.
While the Indian
government appears to have been slow to act out of bureaucratic indifference,
other threats do not seem to have played a major role. This relative lack of concern is consistent
with India’s long-standing commitment to a free and often highly critical
press, and Indian pride in being the world’s largest democracy.
China is more
concerned than is India about the political risks of information in general,
including the Internet. The Chinese government is sensitive to the impact that
the mass media, facsimile machines, tape recorders, and Internet news groups
had during the Tiananman Square demonstrations. It also witnessed the fall of
the Soviet Union after information flows were liberalized, including the use of
the Internet during the Soviet coup attempt.[31] Ironically, Chinese national security
concerns led the government to focus its attention on the Internet prior to
India, and this may have accelerated growth.
While it took some
time to decide to what extent they would participate in the Internet and which
agencies should be involved, the Chinese decided the benefits outweighed the
risks. Once they decided to move, they acted
quickly. The Chinese State Council
authorized four government organizations to run networks that interconnect with
the global Internet, and the threat of competition between them influenced
deployment, service, and pricing. In addition to running their own ISPs, both
China Telcom's ChinaNET and the
Ministry of Electronic Industries (MEI)
ChinaGBN were willing to sell support to private ISPs; whereas, in India there
was no backbone competition.
While the Chinese
government has moved forward with the Internet, it is attempting to minimize
the risks by maintaining control over access, use, and content. The December,
1997 regulations promulgated by the Chinese Ministry of Public Security are
extremely broad and forbid the transmission of information that injures the reputation
of state organs, incites division of the country or resistance to the
Constitution, laws, or implementation of administrative regulations. There are
also prohibitions on promoting feudal superstitions, sexually suggestive
material, gambling, or violence, and user registration is also mandated. The recent sentencing of Lin Hai to two
years in prison for providing 30,000 email addresses to a “hostile foreign
organization” and the establishment by the national police ministry of task
forces for Internet monitoring in search of “seditious talk” are indications of
China’s determination to control the Internet.
To
some extent, the differing levels of concern with security issues between China
and India may be a result of the influence and size of their respective
militaries. Chinese Military
expenditures are nearly four times those of India,[32]
and the PLA has been more heavily involved with the Internet (seeking to be an
ISP) than the Indian military.
In
contrast to the Union Government, Indian State governments have had a positive
influence on the Internet.[33] For example, in West Bengal and the capital
of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, proactive State governments have provided
incentives to involve private firms in Internet-related ventures, in which both
the government and the firm share equity, establishing a Singapore-like middle
ground between government control and laissez
faire. In these and other cases,
state projects and partnerships between state and local governments and private
enterprise have preceded and contributed to national planning and action in
India.
Similarly, decentralization has played a role in
China. The distributed nature of the
Internet has worked well within the context of the distributed organization of
China Telecom itself. Posts and
Telecommunications Bureaus at the city level can invest in their own ISPs while
being connected to the provincial or national backbone. This led to a rapid rollout of ChinaNET
during 1995-6 to all Provinces. China
has embraced markets, and there is considerable competition among local
governments in IT and other areas.
Looking
to the Future
The governments have played major roles in both
nations. The Chinese government
addressed the Internet late, after their own academic networks and world developments
made it clear that this was strategic infrastructure. Once they decided the potential benefits outweighed the risks,
they created two backbone providers and many access providers, while attempting
to maintain control over access, use and content. The Indian government has been more passive, neglecting the
Internet and allowing it to be controlled by bureaucratic monopolies.
However,
the situation in both nations is now changing dramatically. Coincident with the
merger of the MEI and MPT into the MII, the Chinese government separated the
regulatory authority from the operating organizations, and is seeking to
introduce some degree of competition. It remains to be seen what the impact of
this move will be, but it will surely affect the course of Internet diffusion
in China.
The changes in India are potentially more
dramatic. The speed with which the IT
Task Force moved is indicative of the changing government attitude. Within 90 days, it produced an extensive Background Report and a 108-recommendation
Action Plan.[34] The Task Force could act quickly because it
built upon the experience and frustration of the state governments,
universities, and industry. Much of its
plan is also consistent with the thinking and recommendations of international
bodies like the WTO, ITU, and World Bank, and it had the example of similar
plans in Singapore and other nations.
The Task Force did not start from scratch -- it surveyed the opinions of
Indian computing and networking leaders and recommended what it heard. This was less a task of invention than of
sparking action on a consensus that had already evolved.
The
remainder of this section compares the likely impact of the Indian
liberalization and the Task Force recommendations and Chinese consolidation and
other factors on the diffusion of the Internet in the two nations. We consider the six dimensions introduced
earlier.
Pervasiveness
At
present, the Internet is confined to large cities in both nations. While these groups are far from saturated,
high levels of pervasiveness will require service to the lower urban classes
and villages, which raises issues of public access, service in villages,
education and language, and affordability.
It
will be many years before PCs are affordable by average Indian or Chinese
families, and the bulk of urban residents will be dependent upon public access
facilities. The Indian Action Plan
calls for the establishment and facilitation of public access points, and it
suggests that Internet access might be provided by upgrading the 600,000
privately run public telephone offices in the country today. These will not solve the entire problem,
because many are small and under-capitalized and staffed, but some will
doubtless become Internet access points.
Some state governments also have plans for public access programs. While the Chinese have no policy on
universal access or the spread of the Internet to villages, they do plan to
extend telephone service to every village, indicating that universal access is
a consideration.
Pervasive
penetration will require connectivity in villages, which comprise approximately
70% of the population in both India and China.[35] The Indian Action Plan calls for taking
"all the necessary steps to boost
IT for agricultural and integrated rural development," and calls for pilot and research projects.
These are lofty goals, but telephone service in rural India is very poor, with
approximately half of villages having no phones. The Indian government may be reversing a policy of neglect, and
the government appears to be more aware of villages than that of China.
Whether
in villages or urban areas, computer users must be literate, and illiteracy
will constrain Internet penetration in both nations.[36] The problem is greatest in India, with an
overall illiteracy rate of 48% as compared to 19% in China.[37] This gap may be expected to continue into
the future, since the average primary school class in China has 22 students per
teacher compared to 64 in India.[38]
Language is also a major issue in achieving widespread
network utilization. The Indian
constitution recognizes 14 languages, but an estimated 179 languages and 544
dialects are used. While 30% of the population speaks Hindi, it is still an
unpopular, foreign language in the south, Bengal, and other regions.[39] China is dominated by the Mandarin dialect,
and both Cantonese and Mandarin use the same character set. This has made standardization on a native
language in China easier than India, leading to a higher level of Chinese
content on the Internet.
The fact that most e-mail packages did not
support 8 bit encoding, made using English a necessity at first, but today, as
programs that support Chinese become common, more and more Chinese are
utilizing Chinese in email. There has
been a government effort to develop Chinese-language content.
In India, the local
language market is fragmented, and English is therefore used on most Web sites;
however, the Action Plan states that "A major promotional campaign shall
soon be launched to boost IT in Indian languages." In addition to developing content, technical
issues of support for Indian languages in software packages and font standards
must be addressed. The government has
supported some research in this area[40]
and Windows 2000 will support Hindi and Tamil.
ERNET also distributes local-language software free of charge.
While government action and programs will encourage Internet penetration in both nations, free market purchase of PCs will still be a key determinant of pervasiveness, and this is tied to affordability. The Indian Action Plan will help with duty reduction and other incentives to lowering computer prices, eliminating gift taxes on PCs, financial subsidy for teachers and students, etc.; however, both nations will benefit from the rapid reduction in the cost of Internet-capable PCs arising fr